TORTS-

NEGLIGENCE-FIREMAN'S RULE APPLICABLE TO POLICE OFFI-

cEas-Berko v. Freda, 93 N.J. 81, 459 A.2d 663 (1983).
The "fireman's rule" prevents a firefighter injured in the normal
course of fighting a fire from suing the person whose negligence2
caused the fire.' The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Berko v. Freda,
applied the rule to police officers, thereby insulating a negligent
tortfeasor from a lawsuit by a police officer who was injured in the
course of dealing with the negligent conduct which gave rise to the
3
officer's presence at the scene.
In Berko, the defendant, Ralph Freda, parked his automobile in
a supermarket parking lot and left the keys in the ignition.4 Codefendant, Paul Harrigan, and another juvenile 5 stole the car. 6 Later
the same day John Berko, the plaintiff, and another police officer saw
the youths driving the stolen car and gave chase. 7 The pursuit proceeded at high speed, and in the course of the chase the defendantdriver, Harrigan, allegedly rammed the police car three times.' When
the vehicle finally was brought to a halt, Officer Berko attempted to
remove Harrigan from the front seat of the car through the open
door. 9 At that time, Harrigan's foot "hit the gas pedal,"' 0 causing
Officer Berko to be dragged forward by the car, and resulting in
injuries to Berko." Berko sued Freda, claiming Freda was negligent in
leaving the keys in the ignition of the parked car.12 Berko also sued
3
Harrigan for negligent operation of the stolen vehicle.'
Krauth v. Israel Geller & Buckingham Homes, Inc., 31 N.J. 270. 157 A.2d 129 (1960).

93 N.J. 81, 459 A.2d 663 (1983).
3 Id. at 84, 459 A.2d at 664.
4 Id.

at 83, 459 A.2d at 664.

5 John Dombrauskas, the other juvenile involved in the incident, xwas not named by the
plaintiff, but was impleaded by defendant Freda as a third party defendant. Berko v. Freda, 172
N.J. Super. 436, 412 A.2d 821 (Law Div. 1980), aff'd, 182 N.J. Super. 396, 442 A.2d 208 (App.
Div. 1982), aJf'd, 93 N.J. 81, 459 A.2d 663 (1983).
1 Berko, 93 N.J. at 83, 459 A.2d at 664.
7 Id.
8 Berko v. Freda, 172 N.J. Super. 436, 437, 412 A.2d 821, 822 (Law Div. 1980). afJd. 182
N.J. Super. 396, 442 A.2d 208 (App. Div. 1982). aJffd. 93 N.J. 81, 459 A.2d 663 (1983).
Berko, 93 N.J. at 83, 459 A.2d at 664.
'0 The trial court found that Harrigan intentionally stepped on the accelerator, and that this
act amounted to an assault. Berko v. Freda, 172 N.J. Super. 436, 439, 412 A.2d 821 (Law Div.
1980), afj'd, 182 N.J. Super. 396, 442 A.2d 208 (App. Div. 1982), aJfd, 93 N.J. 81. 459 A.2d 663
(1983).
1 Berko, 93 N.J. at 83, 459 A.2d at 664.
12 Id.
The trial court's opinion stated that Berko sued Harrigan for intentional injuries that
'1 Id.
Harrigan inflicted. Berko v. Freda, 172 N.J. Super. 436, 437, 412 A.2d 821. 822 (Law Dix'.
1980), aJJ'd, 182 N.J. Super. 396, 442 A.2d 208 (App. Div. 1982), aJJ'd, 93 N.J. 81, 459 A.2d 663
(1983). It should also be noted that the suit against Harrigan was for intentional injuries. Berko
v. Freda, 182 N.J. Super. 396, 442 A.2d 208 (App. Dix'. 1982), aJJ'd. 93 N.J. 81 459 A.2d 663

(1983).
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In granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Freda, 14
the trial court stated two bases for its decision. The court found first,
that the intervening intentional assault on Officer Berko was not
foreseeable,1 5 and second, that the "fireman's rule" applied to Officer
Berko, thereby barring his suit against Freda."' The appellate division
affirmed, relying solely on the ground that the "fireman's rule" barred
the plaintiffs suit.'" The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification,s and in a four to two decision, written by Justice Clifford over
the dissent of Justice Handler, affirmed the appellate division's holding.' 9 The court held that any suit arising from an act of ordinary
negligence which provided the occasion for a police officer's or firefighter's presence at the site where the injury occurred is barred by
20
application of the fireman's rule.

Traditionally, the viability of a law suit against a landowner or
occupier, brought by a police officer or fireman for injuries received
while performing his duties, was dependent upon the officer's status as
an entrant upon the land. 2' Although there are occasional exceptions, 22 most jurisdictions still adhere to property-based distinctions
which classify firefighters and police officers as licensees. Thus recov-

'4 Berko v. Freda, 172 N.J. Super. 436, 442, 412 A.2d 821, 824 (Law Div. 1980), afJ'd, 182
N.J. Super. 396, 442 A.2d 208 (App. Div. 1982), aff'd, 93 N.J. 81, 459 A.2d 663 (1983).
15Id. at 439, 412 A.2d at 823. The trial court stated that '[w]hile it may be reasonably
foreseeable that a car thief will use a car negligently, it is hardly reasonably foreseeable that he
will use it in an intentional act which amounts to an assault." Id. The Berko trial court
distinguished Zinck v. Whelan, 120 N.J. Super. 432, 294 A.2d 727 (App. Div. 1972), wherein the
court held that the owner of a car who had left the keys in the ignition could be held liable for
injuries caused by the thief because of the foreseeability of the theft and subsequent mishandling
of the vehicle.
I" Berko v. Freda, 172 N.J. Super. 436, 442, 412 A.2d 821, 824 (Law Div. 1980), afJ'd, 182
N.J. Super. 396, 442 A.2d 208 (App. Div. 1982), afJ'd, 93 N.J. 81, 459 A.2d 663 (1983).
" Berko v. Freda, 182 N.J. Super. 396, 396-97, 442 A.2d 208, 208 (App. Div. 1982), aft'd,
93 N.J. 81, 459 A.2d 663 (1983). The appellate division found that it was unnecessary to consider
the foreseeability rationale, given the application of the fireman's rule to the case. The court
specifically stated that its failure to address the issue of the lack of foreseeabilitv of an intervening
assault should not be construed as an approval of the trial court's reasoning on that issue. Id. at
397. 442 A.2d at 208. Thus, by refusing to endorse the law division's reasoning on foreseeability,
the court left intact its prior decisions dealing with the foreseeability of criminal conduct. Id.;
see, e.g., Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 441 A.2d 1141 (1982) (repetition of criminal
assaults in supermarket parking lot foreseeable); Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436
(1980) (assault of tenant in common areas of apartment building foreseeable).
8 Berko v. Freda, 89 N.J. 446, 446 A.2d 166 (1982).
" Berko, 93 N.J. at 91, 459 A.2d at 668.
20 Id. at 84, 459 A.2d at 664.
21 See generally Annot., 86 A.L.R. 2d 1205 (1962).
22 See, e.g., Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Campagna, 146 Tenn. 389, 242 S.W. 646 (1922)(firemen classified as invitees).
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eries are allowed only in cases of wanton or willful injury, or in cases
where the landowner breached a duty to warn of known, hidden
dangers. 23 In Krauth v. Israel Geller & Buckingham Homes, Inc. ,24
however, former Chief Justice Weintraub noted that a firefighter's
situation is such that he cannot easily be categorized as either a
licensee or an invitee, and hence his status is sui generis.25 The court
based this determination on the lack of fairness that results if recoveries for similarly situated firefighters are founded on property-based
classifications. 26
Since 1960, Krauth has been New Jersey's standard for determining an actor's liability to a firefighter injured while attending to a fire
which was the result of the actor's negligence. In Krauth, a firefighter
was injured when he fell from an uncompleted balcony on a house
under construction. 27 In an opinion by Chief Justice Weintraub, the
New Jersey Supreme Court held that a paid firefighter may not sue an
28
owner or occupier of premises for negligence in causing the fire.
While noting that assumption of the risk is the rationale often given
for this doctrine, the court seemed to place more emphasis on public
policy, 29 stating that if all persons who had either "cause[d] or fail[ed]

23

See W. PRossER,

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 397 (4th

ed. 1971); Krauth v. Israel

Geller & Buckingham Homes, Inc., 31 N.J. 270, 275-76, 157 A.2d 129, 132 (1960); infra notes
24-33 and accompanying text; see also Lipson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 362, 371, 644 P.2d
822, 828, 182 Cal. Rptr. 629, 635 (1982); infra note 69.
There is also some authority suggesting the possibility of a law suit if a firefighter or police
officer is injured by conduct violative of a statute or ordinance. See Annot., 86 A.L.R. 2d 1205,
1218 (1962). The court, however, must first find that the statute or ordinance in question was
intended specifically to protect firefighters or police officers. Compare Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.
2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960) (fire ordinances found intended to protect firefighters) with Kelly
v. Henry Muhs Co., 71 N.J.L. 358, 59 A. 23 (Sup. Ct. 1904) (statute requiring elevators and
trapdoors be protected by guardrails not specifically intended to protect firefighters).
24 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960).
2-5 Id. at 272, 157 A.2d at 130. The court reasoned that a firefighter's entry does not depend
on permission or invitation of the owner. Indeed, the firefighter enters as a matter of right, and
cannot be denied admission. Id.
26 Id. at 273, 157 A.2d at 130. It should be noted that, unlike some jurisdictions, see, e.g.,
Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968), New Jersey has not
completely abandoned the use of status-based classifications. See Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., 30
N.J. 303, 311, 153 A.2d 1, 5 (1959) ("common law classifications are sufficiently flexible to fulfill
the purposes of our legal system in serving the needs of present day society"); Walsh v. Madison
Park Properties, Ltd., 102 N.J. Super. 134, 245 A.2d 512 (App. Div. 1968) (firefighters on
premises for purpose of inspecting broken fire escape considered business invitees).
27 Krauth, 31 N.J. at 275, 157 A.2d at 131.
28 Id. at 273, 157 A.2d at 130.
29 Id., 157 A.2d at 130-31. The court noted that:
it is the fireman's business to deal with that very hazard and hence, perhaps by
analogy to the contractor engaged as an expert to remedy dangerous situations, he
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to prevent" a fire through their own carelessness were held liable for
injuries suffered by firefighters who were employed specifically to
firefighting, the burden on such
confront the hazards associated 3with
0
great.
too
be
would
individuals
The plaintiff in Krauth alleged that the defendant's conduct was
wanton and claimed an exception to the rule. 3' The court observed
that wantonness is a term lacking precision, and while it is possible
that wanton conduct in causing a fire could provide an exception to
the fireman's rule, the facts in the case suggested that the conduct was
not "wanton" as the term is commonly understood. 32 With regard to
the culpability of the tortfeasor, the court stated in dictum that it was
questionable whether degrees of culpability were relevant with respect to the negligence that caused the fire, given the public 33policy
considerations underlying the tortfeasor's immunity from suit.
The fireman's rule again became an issue four years later in
Jackson v. Velveray Corp. 34 Two firemen were injured in the course
of fighting a fire in a factory building which housed the defendant's
business. 35 The plaintiffs36 seized upon language in Krauth which
stated that despite the overwhelming authority supporting nonliability for negligence in causing a fire, there was "appreciable authority"
supporting the proposition that suit should be allowed where the

cannot complain of negligence in the creation of the very occasion for his engagement. In terms of duty, it may be said that there is none owed the fireman to exercise
care so as not to require the special services for which he is trained and paid.
Id. at 273-74, 157 A.2d at 131.
10 Id. at 274, 157 A.2d at 131. The court suggested that it would be improper to allow an
injured firefighter to recover from the person whose negligence caused the fire, since the
firefighter is adequately compensated to confront the hazards incident to his occupation. Id. For
a detailed analysis of the notion of "cost-spreading," see Comment, The Fireman s Rule: Defining Its Scope Using the Cost-Spreading Rationale, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 218 (1983).
31 Krauth, 31 N.J. at 275-76, 157 A.2d at 132. The plaintiff argued that the device, a heater
used to dry plaster, which had caused the fire had precipitated several prior false alarms. Id. at
276, 157 A.2d at 132.
32 Id. at 277, 157 A.2d at 131. The court, therefore found it unnecessary to address a
"wantonness" exception to the fireman's rule. The court defined wanton in this context to mean
"the act or the omission to discharge a duty must be intentional, and coupled with a consciousness, actual or imputed, of a high degree of probability that harm. . .will ensue." Id., 157 A.2d
at 132-33. Further, the court specifically pointed out that it was not deciding the possible
liability "of an arsonist or one who deliberately induces a false alarm." Id., 157 A.2d at 132.
31 Id. The notion that degrees of culpability may not be relevant in determining the liability
of the tortfeasor was cited approvingly in Jackson v. Velveray Corp., 82 N.J. Super. 469, 474,
198 A.2d 115, 118 (App. Div. 1964); see infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
34 82 N.J. Super. 469, 198 A.2d 115 (App. Div. 1964).
35 Id. at 472, 198 A.2d at 117.
16 One of the firemen died as a result of the injuries sustained in the fire, and his widow
brought suit for wrongful death and damages. Id., 198 A.2d at 116.
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negligent tortfeasor's acts or omissions resulted in "undue risks." The
Krauth court characterized undue risks as those beyond being "inevitably involved in fire fighting. '37 The plaintiffs argued that certain
acts of negligence by the defendants fell within that realm of "undue
risk," and further, that the defendants' negligence contributed to the
spread of the fire. 38 The Jackson court, however, ruled in favor of the
defendants. Judge Sullivan, writing for the court, interpreted "undue
risk" to refer only to hazards that are not normally associated with the
fire itself. 39 With regard to the plaintiffs' contention that the defendants' negligence had created an undue risk by causing the fire to
spread rapidly, the court held that the rule of nonliability extended
beyond the negligence which created the fire to include the negligence
related to the spreading of the fire. 40 The court stressed that the focus
of the inquiry into what constitutes "undue risk" should not be directed to acts or omissions occurring prior to the firefighters' arrival,
but rather to the nature of the risks confronting the firefighters once
4
on the scene.

1

Ferrarov. Demetrakis,42 decided in 1979, provided the appellate
division with an opportunity to deal with issues remaining unresolved
after Jackson. Ferraro involved a fire that was caused by a defective
oil burner. 43 The plaintiffs44 alleged that certain defendants-those

who had been contracted to repair the oil burner-had negligently
failed to correct the defect, 45 and that recovery against those defendants should not be barred because the fireman's rule only precluded
recovery from landowners and occupiers, not from other negligent

Krauth, 31 N.J. at 274, 157 A.2d at 131.
s Jackson, 82 N.J. Super. at 473, 198 A.2d at 117. The specific negligent acts charged were:
(1) negligence in maintenance and operation of the sprinkler system; (2) storage and use of
inflammables contrary to the local ordinance; (3) failure to call the fire department; (4) failure to
have a trained employee fire brigade; (5) cracks and openings in the flooring of the building; and
(6) poor housekeeping. Id.
Id. at 475, 198 A.2d at 118-19. The risks that the court found to be inherent were: smoke,
I3
flames, and collapses of ceilings or walls, since these are the hazards "a fireman must ordinarily
anticipate," id., and suggested an open elevator shaft as an example of hidden perils which
constitute "undue risks." Id., 198 A.2d at 118-19.
40 Id., 198 A.2d at 118. The court did, however, note that the storage of dangerous substances could, in some cases, produce an "undue risk." Id. at 478, 198 A.2d at 120.
41 Id. at 479, 198 A.2d at 121.
42 167 N.J. Super. 429, 400 A.2d 1227 (App. Div. 1979).
43 Id. at 430, 400 A.2d at 1228.
4' There were four plaintiffs in this action: a fireman who had suffered personal injuries
while fighting the fire; his wife, who sued for loss of consortium; and the widows of two firemen
who died of smoke inhalation. Id. at 430-31, 400 A.2d at 1228.
41 Id. at 431, 400 A.2d at 1228.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:759

parties. 4 In addition, the plaintiffs claimed that recovery should not
be denied since the firemen in question were volunteers, and the
Krauth court specifically held that the rule bars suit only by a "paid
conduct fell
fireman. ' 47 Finally, it was claimed that the defendants'
48
within the "wantonness exception" stated in Krauth.
On the issue of limiting the rule's application to suits against
owners or occupiers of land, the court conceded that the rule has
generally been stated in terms of landowners and occupiers. 49 The
court nevertheless applied the rule to third parties as well. 50 With
respect to the assertion that the rule should be limited to paid firemen,
the court again admitted that the rule had been cast in those terms. 5'
The court, however, reasoned that differential treatment was not
warranted 52 because both volunteer and professional firemen assume
the same risks, and volunteer firemen are expressly covered by New
Jersey's workers' compensation law. 53 In disposing of plaintiffs' argu-

46 See Krauth, 31 N.J. at 273, 157 A.2d at 130; supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
4 d.; see also Jackson, 82 N.J. Super. at 473, 198 A.2d at 117 (case involving paid firemen).
The plaintiffs in Ferraroalso argued that the "undue risk" doctrine applied, but the court held
that smoke inhalation was a risk common to firefighting. Ferraro,167 N.J. Super. at 432, 400
A.2d at 1229. It was also claimed that the fireman's rule was a denial of equal protection, but the
court declined to address the issue since it had been neither pleaded nor argued at trial. Id. at
431-32, 400 A.2d at 1228-29.
48 Ferraro,167 N.J. Super. at 432, 400 A.2d at 1229; see Krauth, 31 N.J. at 277, 157 A.2d at
132. The Jackson court never addressed the issue of wantonness since the plaintiffs' claim was
based on the "undue risk doctrine." Jackson, 82 N.J. Super. at 474, 198 A.2d at 118; see supra
notes 36-41.
49 Ferraro, 167 N.J. Super. at 433, 400 A.2d at 1229-30; see Krauth, 31 N.J. at 273, 157 A.2d
at 132.
w Ferraro, 167 N.J. Super. at 434, 400 A.2d at 1230. The court noted that other jurisdictions
have applied the fireman's rule to parties other than landowners or occupiers. Id. at 433-34, 400
A.2d at 1230; see Grable v. Varela, 115 Ariz. 222, 564 P.2d 911 (Ct. App. 1977); Scott v. E.L.
Yeager Constr. Co., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1190, 91 Cal. Rptr. 232 (Ct. App. 1970). In addition, the
court pointed out that since a landowner or occupier is immune from suit, a third party with less
control over the property should a fortiori be similarly protected. Ferraro, 167 N.J. Super. at
434, 400 A.2d at 1230.
5' Ferraro, 167 N.J. Super. at 433, 400 A.2d at 1229; see Krauth, 31 N.J. at 273, 157 A.2d at
131. Jackson also involved professional firefighters. Jackson, 82 N.J. Super. at 471, 198 A.2d at
116.
52 Ferraro, 167 N.J. Super. at 433, 400 A.2d at 1229. This is particularly significant for New
Jersey, since of the 546 municipalities in the state reporting to have fire departments, approximately 490 of them are served in whole or in part by volunteer firefighters. See THE NEw JEasEY
MUNICIPAL DATA BOOK (A. Garwood ed. 1983).
53 Ferraro, 167 N.J. Super. at 433, 400 A.2d at 1229; see also Baker v. Superior Court, 129
Cal. App. 3d 710, 717, 181 Cal. Rptr. 311, 315 (Ct. App. 1982) ("paid call" firefighters who
received five dollars per call and provided own transportation and clothing also barred by
fireman's rule from bringing suit). Both paid and volunteer firefighters are expressly covered by
New Jersey's workers' compensation law. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-43 (West 1981). Voluntary firefighters are covered if injured "doing public fire duty." Additionally, volunteer firemen
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ment that the conduct in Ferrarofell within Krauth's "wantonness
exception, 5' 4 the court noted that the Krauth decision never created
such an exception because that issue was expressly not decided in that
the Krauth opinion as
case. 55 Moreover, the court in Ferraro5read
6
exception.
the
of
impliedly disapproving
Thus, as of 1979, the New Jersey courts had firmly established
the viability of the fireman's rule in the state, but still had not applied
the rule to police officers. 57 Indeed, in 1977 the New Jersey Supreme
Court decided Hill v. Yaskin, 58 a case factually quite similar to Berko,
and allowed the injured police officer to proceed with the suit. 59
Curiously, the fireman's rule was not discussed in the case. Rather,
the case was decided on the basis of the foreseeability of the theft and
subsequent mishandling of the vehicle. 6°
Three and one half years later in Trainorv. Santana,6 1 the New
Jersey Supreme Court was squarely presented with an opportunity to

are accorded favored treatment under several sections of the statute. For example, N.J. STAT.
ANN, § 34:15-74 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984) requires the municipality to obtain workers'
compensation insurance for volunteer firefighters. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-43.2 (West Cum.
Supp. 1983-1984) creates a presumption of occupational disease for certain respiratory ailments
when occurring in volunteer firefighters. Finally, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-75 (West Cum. Supp.
1983-1984) gives rise to a conclusive presumption that an injured volunteer firefighter's wages
were sufficient to entitle him or her to the maximum compensation authorized under the law.
Krauth, 31 N.J. at 277, 157 A.2d at 132.
Ferraro, 167 N.J. Super. at 432, 400 A.2d at 1229 (citing Krauth, 31 N.J. at 277, 157 A.2d
at 132).
56 Ferraro,167 N.J. Super. at 432-33, 400 A.2d at 1229. In support of this proposition, the
Ferrarocourt referred to the portion of the Krauth opinion which states: " 'Inthe context of the
policy considerations which underlie the rule of non-liability for negligence with respect to the
origination of a fire, it is debatable whether degrees of culpability are at all pertinent.' "'Id.
(quoting Krauth, 31 N.J. at 277, 157 A.2d at 132).
51 But cf. Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 571 P.2d 609, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1977)
(applying fireman's rule to police officers); Whitten v. Miami-Dade Water & Sewer Auth., 357
So. 2d 430 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (same).
5875 N.J. 139, 380 A.2d 1107 (1977).
59 Id. at 142, 380 A.2d at 1108. In Hill the police officer was injured in a collision with a
stolen automobile he was pursuing. The car's owner had left the car, with the keys in the
ignition, in a parking lot. The police officer sued both the owner of the vehicle and the proprietor
of the lot. In Berko the majority and the dissent sharply disagreed over the role that Hill should
have played in the court's decision. Rejecting Justice Handler's dissenting argument that Hill
should have controlled in Berko, the majority pointed out that the fireman's rule was not raised
in Hill. Further, the Berko majority suggested that Justice Handler's argument was inconsistent
with his position in the later case of Trainor v. Santana, 86 N.J. 403, 432 A.2d 23 (1981) which
noted that Hill "lacked precedential value insofar as the applicability of the fireman's rule [to a
police officer] was concerned." Id. at 408, 432 A.2d at 25.
60 Hill, 75 N.J. at 147, 380 A.2d at 1111; see Zinck v. Whelan, 120 N.J. Super. 432, 294 A.2d
727 (App. Div. 1972); supra note 15.
-186 N.J. 403, 432 A.2d 23 (1981).
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consider the application of the fireman's rule to police officers. In
Trainor, the plaintiff police officer gave chase to a speeding vehicle.
After the defendant's automobile was stopped, the plaintiff opened
the door of the car in order to examine the defendant's license and to
place him under arrest. At that time the defendant attempted to close
the door, momentarily pinning the officer's arms in it, and sped away.
Because the car was on ice it did not move forward immediately, thus
giving the officer a second to free his arms from the door. When the
automobile suddenly lurched forward, however, it hit the police officer as he attempted to jump clear of the car. 62 The officer brought an
action against the defendant for the injuries sustained, claiming that
his actions constituted negligent driving.6 3 At trial, over the defendant's objection, the judge refused to instruct the jury as to the fireman's rule. 64 On appeal, the defendant claimed that the failure to
charge the jury on the fireman's rule, or to grant his motion for
judgment on the same ground, was prejudicial error.6 5 Nevertheless,
the appellate division affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that
the defendant's striking of the plaintiff with his car was not a "foreseeable risk of the officer's exercise of his police function at the time. "66
Further, the court held that the application of the rule in this context
would be neither fair nor just, 7 citing to language from Krauth 8 to
support that proposition.

62

Id. at 404-05, 432 A.2d at 23-24.

63 Id. at 403-04, 432 A.2d at 23. The court noted that the officer's proofs supported an action

in intentional tort but the issue was not addressed, since the complaint charged only negligence.
Id. at 405 n.2, 432 A.2d at 24 n.2.
64 Id. at 405, 432 A.2d at 24.
'- Trainor v. Santana, 174 N.J. Super. 619, 622, 417 A.2d 112, 113 (App. Div. 1980), aff'd,
86 N.J. 403, 432 A.2d 23 (1981).
61 Id. at 623, 417 A.2d at 114.
67 Id.
68 Krauth, 31 N.J. at 273, 157 A.2d at 130. The portion of the Krauth opinion in which the
words "fair and just" appear is as follows:
In what circumstances should the owner or occupier respond to the injured fireman?
That the misfortune here experienced by a fireman was well within the range of
foreseeability cannot be disputed. But liability is not always co-extensive with foreseeability of harm. The question is ultimately one of public policy, and the answer
must be distilled from the relevant factors involved upon an inquiry into what is fair
and just.
Id. Thus, in Krauth the inquiry into what was "fair and just" referred to the policy reasons
supporting the denial of a cause of action to an injured firefighter. The appellate division in
Trainor used this same phrase, taken out of its original context, as a basis for permitting suit by
an injured police officer. Trainor v. Santana, 174 N.J. Super. 619, 623, 417 A.2d 112, 114 (App.
Div. 1980), afJ'd, 86 N.J. 403, 432 A.2d 23 (1981).
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The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification and affirmed the holding of the appellate division. The court reasoned that
even if the fireman's rule were applied to police officers, the facts of
Trainorwould remove the defendant from the protection of the rule.6 9
The court pointed out that, if extended to police officers, the rule
would only bar recovery for "acts of ordinary negligence" which
precipitated the officer's presence at the scene of the injury.7 0 The
supreme court pointed out that Hill lacked precedential value because
the fireman's rule was never raised in that case. 7 ' The failure of the
parties in Hill to raise the issue of the fireman's rule, and the presence
of an independent act of misconduct in Trainor, prevented the New
Jersey Supreme Court in those cases from dealing squarely with the
extension of the fireman's rule to police officers. Unlike the defendants
in Hill and Trainor, however, Ralph Freda did raise the fireman's
rule, and he had committed no independent acts of misconduct.
In deciding Berko, the supreme court initially dealt with an
argument raised by the dissent to the effect that the prevalence and
availability of liability insurance render the rule anachronistic.

72

Jus-

tice Handler, in dissent, noted that a major concern in Krauth was the
likelihood that an undue burden might be placed on a single tortfeasor
in the absence of a fireman's rule. In support of his argument, Justice
Handler pointed to New Jersey's liberal view regarding interspousal
tort immunity, which is based in part on the availability of liability
insurance. 73 The majority disagreed, noting that the Krauth court was

" Trainor, 86 N.J. at 407, 432 A.2d at 25. The court observed that even if the rule were
adopted as stated, it would not apply under the facts of Trainor, given that the injurious acts
were committed after the officer was present at the scene and the defendant was aware of his
presence. Id.
In jurisdictions applying the fireman's rule there is general agreement that subsequent acts
of misconduct are not protected by the rule. See, e.g., Lipson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d. 362,
644 P.2d 822, 182 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1982) (fireman's rule inapplicable to shield defendant who had
misrepresented to firefighters on scene toxic nature of burning materials); see also Malo v. Willis,
126 Cal. App. 3d 543, 178 Cal. Rptr. 774 (Ct. App. 1981) (cause of action allowed where
policeman, after stopping speeding motorist, was injured when driver depressed clutch instead of
brake).
70 Trainor, 86 N.J. at 407, 432 A.2d at 25.
Id. at 408, 432 A.2d at 25; see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
I7
7' Berko, 93 N.J. at 84, 459 A.2d at 664.
71 Id. at 101 n.5, 459 A.2d at 673 n.5. The dissent referred to Eule v. Eule Motor Sales, 34
N.J. 537, 170 A.2d 241 (1961) (wife allowed to sue partnership of which husband was member,
for injuries received while passenger in partnership-owned vehicle which her husband was
driving). The court in Eule allowed suit because of the routine practice of businesses to purchase
insurance covering employees. Eule, 34 N.J. at 540, 170 A.2d at 242. Justice Handler then cited
to the dissenting opinion in Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 253, 163 A.2d 147, 151 (1960)
(Jacobs, J., dissenting) (arguing minor child injured as result of father's negligent driving should
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familiar with the role liability insurance had played in the development of New Jersey's tort law, 4 and nevertheless applied the fireman's
75
rule in that case.
The court introduced its discussion of the fireman's rule by noting
that the New Jersey courts have recognized the rule's validity for more
than twenty years. 76 Clarifying the rule as enunciated in Krauth,
Justice Clifford distinguished between the negligence that is responsible for bringing the officers to the scene and the injuries suffered from
independent causes subsequent to their arrival, and pointed out that
77
the doctrine bars suits only for the former, but not the latter. To
illustrate the point, the court referred to a hypothetical situation in
which an illegally speeding motorist strikes a police officer while the
78
officer is in the process of ticketing an unlawfully parked vehicle. In
person who
such a case, the fireman's rule would bar suit against the
79
motorist.
speeding
the
against
not
parked illegally, but

be permitted to sue because vast majority of motorists carry liability insurance); see also Immer
v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 489, 267 A.2d 481, 484 (1970) (concern over disruption in conjugal
harmony by allowing interspousal tort actions in automobile accident cases mitigated by fact
that "a recovery will in most cases be paid by the insurance carrier rather than by the defendant
spouse"). It was the very presence of insurance, however, that posed the second, and likely more
important problem in allowing recovery for interspousal torts-namely the possibility of fraud
and collusion on the part of the spouses. Id. at 489, 267 A.2d at 485. This concern persisted after
Immer and was finally resolved in Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978), in
favor of allowing interspousal suits for injuries in general. Nevertheless, both cases recognized
that the presence of insurance coverage should be a factor in considering the permissibility of
suit. In favor of Justice Handler's position, the argument could be raised that, to the extent that
marital discord or possible collusion is not at issue in suits between firefighters and homeowners,
there is at least a precedential basis for a consideration of the availability of insurance in the
"fireman's rule" context.
" Berko, 93 N.J. at 84, 459 A.2d at 664. In support of this contention, Justice Clifford cited
Eule v. Eule Motor Sales, 34 N.J. 537, 170 A.2d 241 (1961) and Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J.
247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960). While the Krauth court was surely aware of these cases, it could not
have been aware of Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970) and Merenoff v. Merenoff,
76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978), which do seem to suggest a greater weight be afforded to
liability insurance when deciding on the permissibility of tort actions. See also Comment, An
Examination of the CaliforniaFireman's Rule, 6 PAC. L.J. 660, 672-73 (1975) (suggesting ready
availability and increasing utilization of homeowners' liability insurance militates against fireman's rule viability).
75 Berko, 93 N.J. at 84, 459 A.2d at 664; see Krauth, 31 N.J. at 273-74, 157 A.2d at 131.
" Berko, 93 N.J. at 84-85, 459 A.2d at 664-65.
" Id. at 85, 459 A.2d at 665.
" Id. (citing Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 202 n.2, 571 P.2d 609, 611 n.2, 142 Cal. Rptr.
152, 154 n.2 (1977)).
7' Berko, 93 N.J. at 85, 459 A.2d at 665. In support of this proposition Justice Clifford cited
Krueger v. City of Anaheim, 130 Cal. App. 3d 166, 181 Cal. Rptr. 631 (Ct. App. 1982)
(fireman's rule inapplicable where police officer acting as security guard was injured in scuffle
with spectator, who ran on field during sports event, because such conduct was separate criminal
act arising after event which occasioned officer's presence). Justice Clifford's choice of this case is
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Having thus reaffirmed its approval of the fireman's rule as
announced in Krauth, the court in Berko directed its attention to the
rule's application to police officers. The court recognized that this
question had been left unanswered in Trainor.80 Justice Clifford
pointed to the similarities between the nature of the duties of firefighters and police officers, and distinguished them from other classes of
public employees."' Justice Clifford noted that most government entities maintain police and fire departments in anticipation of their
inevitable need,8 2 and that both are specifically paid to confront the
hazards necessarily attendant to their duties.8 3 Other classes of public
employees are hired to exercise specific governmental functions which
may only "incidentally involve risk. "84
Justice Clifford then observed that other jurisdictions have applied the rule to police officers, He reasoned that the rule should be
similarly extended in New Jersey because one of the purposes for
which firefighters and police officers are retained by municipalities is
to confront the dangers that will inevitably arise from "their taxpayers' own future acts of negligence. '8 5 Further, the court noted that

somewhat curious, since Krueger also stands for the proposition that the fireman's rule bars suits
for reckless, willful, or wanton acts which occasion the officer's presence at the scene, while the
Berko court limited the applicability of the rule to injuries caused by acts of "ordinary negligence." Berko, 93 N.J. at 89, 459 A.2d at 667.
80Berko, 93 N.J. at 86, 459 A.2d at 666. The Trainor court felt it unnecessary to decide the
issue because the rule, even if it extended to police officers, would not be applicable owing to the
subsequent acts of negligence committed by the defendant. Trainor, 86 N.J. at 407, 432 A.2d at
25; see supra note 69 and accompanying text.
81 Berko, 93 N.J. at 86-87, 459 A.2d at 666.

Id.
11Id. at
82

86, 459 A.2d at 666.
Id. at 87, 459 A.2d at 666. Opponents of the fireman's rule generally are critical of the rule
whether it is applied to police officers or to firefighters. For example, even Acting Chief Justice
Tobriner, in his often cited dissent in Walters v. Sloan, doubted that police officers could be
distinguished from firefighters for purposes of the fireman's rule. Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d
199, 208, 571 P.2d 609, 614, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152, 157 (1977). Where the duties of a police officer
and a firefighter are distinguished, note is usually taken of the greater likelihood that a police
officer will be summoned to deal with a violent criminal. See, e.g., Krueger v. City of Anaheim,
130 Cal. App. 3d 166, 172, 181 Cal. Rptr. 631, 635 (Ct. App. 1982). in which the court
considered the differences between firefighters and police officers, and concluded the differences
'were not sufficient to prevent the rule from extending to police officers. Id. at 172, 181 Cal.
Rptr. at 635. Future litigation may center on whether a given occupation falls within the
definition supplied by the Berko court. For example, the concern evidenced by the legislature in
enacting assault provisions which cover emergency medical personnel may provide a basis for an
argument that these public servants also perform a function which regularly, and not merely
incidentally, involves risk. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1b(5)(c)(West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984);
infra note 139.
15 Berko, 93 N.J. at 87, 459 A.2d at 666; see Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 571 P.2d 609,
142 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1977) (police officer who responded to disturbance at party and was assaulted
84
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allowing suit against a negligent taxpayer, whose conduct was responsible for the summoning of a police officer or firefighter, would be
tantamount to forcing the taxpayer to pay twice for the same protection. 6 The majority based its opinion, however, on more than just
monetary considerations. 87 Specifically, the majority reasoned that
public policy is offended if a citizen must run the risk of civil liability
for acts of ordinary negligence that occasion the presence of a fire88
fighter or police officer.
In the final section of the court's opinion in Berko, Justice Clifford concluded that the facts fit squarely within the court's dictum in
Trainorv. Santana89 that the rule, as applied to police officers, should
only bar suit for "acts of ordinary negligence" which provided the
reason for the officer being present at the place where he was in-

by guest barred by fireman's rule from suing parents and minor host of party). The California
Supreme Court based its decision on several grounds, among them assumption of the risk, id. at
204, 571 P.2d at 612, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 155, and the availability of disability benefits and
workers' compensation. Id. at 205, 571 P.2d at 613, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 156. The court further
relied on a public policy rationale, suggesting that a police officer should not be able to complain
of the negligence which provided the occasion for his engagement. Finally, the court feared that
abrogation of the rule would lead to excessive litigation. Id.; see also Garcia v. City of South
Tuscon, 131 Ariz. 315, 640 P.2d 1117 (Ct. App. 1981) (fireman's rule applied to police generally,
but did not bar suit in this case since police officer's injuries were due to independent act of
negligence of third person); Steelman v. Lind, 97 Nev. 425, 634 P.2d 666 (Nev. 1981) (fireman's
rule barred suit by police officer against driver of vehicle that occasioned officer's presence where
officer was injured by oncoming traffic). Interestingly, one of the grounds offered by the
Steelman court in support of the rule was that its abrogation might discourage persons in need of
police assistance from summoning aid based on a fear of potential civil liability for any injury
that might befall an officer in the course of his response. Id. Dean Prosser considers this
argument to be "preposterous rubbish." W. PROssER, supra note 23, at 397.
81 Berko, 93 N.J. at 88, 459 A.2d at 666. In this regard Justice Clifford approved of the
analogy offered by Justice Weintraub in Krauth of contractors hired to remedy dangerous
situations. Id. (referring to Krauth, 31 N.J. at 273-74, 157 A.2d at 131). Justice Clifford noted:
[A]s with the homeowner who hires a contractor to repair a weakened roof, the
taxpayer who pays the fire and police departments to confront the risks occasioned
by his own future acts of negligence does not expect to pay again when the officer is
injured while exposed to those risks. Otherwise, individual citizens would compensate police officers twice: once for risking injury, once for sustaining it. Moreover,
unlike the roofer, the firefighter does not have time to negotiate a contract with the
owner of a burning home: but that is not to say that a trained firefighter proceeds
unaware of the normal risks inherent in firefighting.
Id. See generally Comment, supra note 30. The dissent claimed that the analogy was improper.
Justice Handler argued that a contract between a homeowner and a contractor is based upon a
"'mutual and voluntary undertaking... which involves risks that have already been created and
are thus unavoidable" whereas the contract between a firefighter and a homewner is not
founded on a mutual agreement nor does it involve risks beyond the homeowner's control. Berko,
93 N.J. at 99 n.4, 459 A.2d at 672 n.4 (Handler, J., dissenting).
87 Berko, 93 N.J. at 88, 459 A.2d at 667.
88 Id. at 88-89, 459 A.2d at 667.
89 86 N.J. 403, 432 A.2d 23 (1981); see supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
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jured. 0 The court observed that Freda's negligence in leaving the keys
in the ignition had invited the theft, which in turn resulted in Officer
Berko's confrontation with the thieves."' Further, Justice Clifford
pointed out that, unlike the defendant in Trainor, Freda had committed no subsequent acts of negligence to bar the application of the
rule. 92
The Berko court then addressed the issue of the liability of the
thief for the intentional assault on the plaintiff. 3 Justice Clifford
observed that the fireman's rule did not operate to bar the plaintiff
police officer's suit in intentional tort against the thief. 94 The court
noted the paradox that is created when a recovery is allowed by a
police officer for an assault: As police officers are hired to deal with
crime which is often violent, they must assume the risk that criminals
will sometimes attempt to injure police officers. 95 The court nevertheless observed that the policy considerations which form the basis
for the fireman's rule 96 do not support barring suits in cases involving
intentional assaults on police officers. 97 Indeed, the court noted that
police officers are paid to risk assault, not to submit to it.9 8

I"Berko,

93 N.J. at 89, 459 A.2d at 667.

91 Id.
92 Id. Regarding the issue of subsequent acts of negligence, the majority observed that the
important distinction between initial and subsequent acts of negligence is that initial negligent
acts prompt the police response, and subsequent acts hinder that response. Id. at 91, 459 A.2d at
668. The court continued: "Just as Krauth .. .saw no duty to exercise care so as not to require a
firefighter's aid, we see no reason to eliminate the duty to exercise care once the firefighter, or a
police officer, begins to render that aid." Id. (emphasis in original)(citation omitted).
93 Id. at 90, 459 A.2d at 667. The trial court, while dismissing the complaint as to Freda.
entered judgment against the thief, Paul Harrigan, in the amount of $212,644.25. Brief of
Defendant-Respondent, Ralph Freda, in Opposition to Petition For Certification at 2, Berko v.
Freda, 93 N.J. 81, 459 A.2d 663 (1983).
14 Berko, 93 N.J. at 90, 459 A.2d at 667.
95Id., 459 A.2d at 667-68. The doctrinal difficulty arises from the assumption of risk
rationale underlying the fireman's rule, which has been criticized for its failure to provide an
adequate doctrinal basis for allowing injured officers to sue for intentionally inflicted injuries.
See generally Comment, supra note 30.
0 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text: infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
Berko, 93 N.J. at 90, 459 A.2d at 668. The court cited to Krueger v. City of Anaheim, 130
Cal. App. 3d 166, 181 Cal. Rptr. 631 (Ct. App. 1982), in support of its position. In Krueger, the
court was concerned that barring suits for intentionally inflicted injuries "would be to countenance unlimited violence directed at the policeman in the course of most routine duties." Id. at
170, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 634, quoted in Berko, 93 N.J. at 90, 459 A.2d at 668.
Il Berko, 93 N.J. at 90, 459 A.2d at 668. The court cited State v. Mirault, 92 N.J. 492, 457
A.2d 455 (1983), as an indication of the legislative sentiment concerning assaults on police
officers. In Mirault the court held that an assault on a police officer attempting to apprehend a
thief was sufficient to elevate the offense from theft to robbery pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C: 15-la, reasoning that the statute, although couched in general terms, was enacted to protect
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The dissenting justices argued that the foreseeability rationale
forming the basis of the Hill decision 9 should have been controlling in
Berko. 00 Further, the dissent maintained that the only basis for the
denial of the plaintiff's cause of action against Freda was his status as
a police officer. 10' Were Officer Berko a civilian, the dissent reasoned,
the suit against the person negligently leaving the keys in the parked
car would lie under existing case law. 102 Justice Handler reasoned that
the duty of care owed by all persons to police officers and firefighters
is not diminished simply because police officers and firefighters are
compensated to confront certain hazards. 0 3 The dissent suggested
that, as compared to other public employees, police officers and firefighters are unfairly burdened in that all public employees other than
police officers and firefighters are permitted to sue negligent third
parties in tort for injuries arising out of their employment.10 4 Justice
Handler found no meaningful distinction between police officers and
firefighters and a "host of other public employees" in terms of the risks
inherent in their occupations. 0 5 As an example of the similarities

police officers as well as members of the general public. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:15-la (West
1982) ("A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he: (1) Inflicts bodily
injury. . upon another ..
"); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-lb(5)(a)(West 1982) (simple
assault elevated to aggravated assault if committed on police officer).
9 Hill, 75 N.J. at 139, 380 A.2d at 1107.
100 Berko, 93 N.J. at 92-93, 459 A.2d at 669; see supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
10 Berko, 93 N.J. at 92, 459 A.2d at 668 (Handler, J., dissenting).
102 Id. (citing Zinck v. Whelan, 120 N.J. Super. 432, 294 A.2d 727 (App. Div. 1972)); see
supra note 15 and accompanying text.
103 Berko, 93 N.J. at 94, 459 A.2d at 670 (Handler, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 95, 459 A.2d at 670 (Handler, J., dissenting). The dissent further pointed out that
these traditional third party tort actions are permitted despite the availability of workers'
compensation insurance. Id.; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-40 (West 1981). Justice Handler stated
that these suits are allowed "because workers' compensation standing alone is rarely adequate
redress." Berko, 93 N.J. at 95, 459 A.2d at 670. While it may be true that, as compared to a
conventional damage recovery, the benefits under the workers' compensation statute may sometimes not provide "adequate redress," that is hardly the reason for allowing third party suits.
Rather, third party suits are allowed because the relationship between the parties is substantially
different from that which exists between employer and employee.
Workers' compensation statutes render the negligence of either party irrelevant, and at the
same time abolish any of the traditional defenses available to employers. In return, the employee
forfeits his right to maintain a common law suit against his employer in negligence. See N.J.
STArT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West 1981) (workers' compensation action is sole remedy for employees).
The rationale which led to this compromise inherent in workers' compensation statutes
simply is not applicable to third parties. Indeed in a case cited by Justice Handler, Schweizer v.
Elox Div. of Colt Indus., 70 N.J. 280, 359 A.2d 857 (1976), Justice Conford writing for a
unanimous court stated that the workers' compensation act "is neutral insofar as the third-party
tortfeasor is concerned, leaving him with his common-law liability to the injured
employee ..
." Id. at 287, 359 A.2d at 861.
105 Berko, 93 N.J. at 95, 459 A.2d at 671 (Handler, J., dissenting).
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between the different classes of public employees, the dissent suggested that, in the course of their employment, traffic officers are
6
exposed to no greater risks than are highway workers. 10
Further, the
dissent argued that members of both classes of public employees also
confront "ordinary" risks, and that police officers should not be denied recovery simply because their employment often involves a
07
greater degree of risk. 1
Justice Handler maintained that the majority's barring of police
officers' suits rested on the dubious assumption that the wages of
police officers are "commensurate with the extraordinary risks of their
jobs." 108 He pointed to a lack of support for that assumption, and
suggested that, in fact, the opposite may be true. Justice Handler
noted, for example, that police and firefighters must resort to compulsory arbitration to resolve salary disputes, 09 and that, historically, the
existing accidental death and disability benefits available to firefighters and police officers were insufficient, as compared to a third party
tort action, to redress completely the injury suffered in the line of
duty. 11

106Id. at 95-96, 459 A.2d at 671 (Handler, J., dissenting). Implicit in the dissent's argument is
the notion that a police officer, struck by a negligent motorist while on traffic duty, would be
barred by the fireman's rule from seeking a recovery from the tortfeasor, while a similarly
situated highway worker would not. This reasoning misinterprets the scope of the rule. The rule
is not intended to bar suits by police officers under all circumstances, but rather it seeks to
protect only the tortfeasor whose conduct was responsible for the officer being summoned to the
scene. The rule was never intended to relieve third parties of the duty of care owed to the
policeman. Thus, in the above example there would be no single tortfeasor responsible for the
officer's presence at his post, and a suit against the negligent motorist would lie. A slight change
in the facts will serve to illustrate the distinction. If while doing traffic duty the officer had
responded to an accident caused by a negligent driver and was injured by a second negligent
motorist, the fireman's rule would only shield the motorist involved in the accident to which the
officer had responded, since that driver's negligence was responsible for the officer's presence at
the scene.
101Id. at 96, 459 A.2d at 671 (Handler, J., dissenting).
108 Id. For a compilation of data dealing with the average salaries of police officers and
firefighters, see Hoetmer, Police, Fire, and Refuse Collection and DisposalDepartments: Personnel, Compensation, and Expenditures, in THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 1983, at 111.
109 Berko, 93 N.J. at 96 n.2, 459 A.2d at 671 n.2 (Handler, J., dissenting). N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
34:13A-14 to -21 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984) provide a comprehensive scheme for settling
labor disputes for firefighters and police officers, including a list of issues that must be considered
by an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators.
110Berko, 93 N.J. at 96 n.2, 459 A.2d at 671 n.2 (Handler, J., dissenting). Specifically, the
dissent argued that the compensation afforded under the relevant legislation for accidental death
or disability is "not measured by the extent or gravity of the disability and resulting damages but
solely by the statutory allowance." Id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:16A-7(2) (West Cum. Supp. 19831984) provides that if an injury qualifies as permanently and totally disabling, the officer shall
receive a pension combined with an annuity based on his contributions to equal two-thirds of his
wages. Justice Handler also observed that accidental disability must be clearly proved to be a
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Justice Handler next discussed the "independent cause exception"
noted in the majority opinion, 1 ' and he interpreted "independent
causes" to be "roughly equivalent to 'abnormal risks.' 1112 The dissent
found the distinction between normal risks and abnormal risks, or
"independent causes," to be unclear, requiring the court to resort to
"hairsplitting" to apply the exception." 3 Justice Handler argued that
the difficulty in applying the "independent cause" exception to the
fireman's rule suggests that the exception is merely "a palliative to
mitigate the regressive effects that the extension and application of the
fireman's rule produces.""14 Further, because of the difficulty in ap-

plying the "independent cause" exception, and the "basic unfairness of
the rule" itself, the dissent predicted that the "exception will be broadened to a point where it will swallow the rule itself.""15
Justice Handler criticized the majority's public policy rationale,
which in part justified the fireman's rule, as a means of avoiding the
imposition of multiple burdens on taxpayers." 6 He took issue with
Justice Clifford's characterization of the tortfeasor as a " 'taxpayer' of
the municipality or governmental entity that employs the police officer or firefighter,"" 71 pointing out that every person, taxpayer or not,
is entitled to police and fire protection." 8 Additionally, Justice
Handler stated that, with regard to public policy, the court previously
had demonstrated a hostility toward immunities which allow injuries
to go unremedied." 9

direct result of the employment. Berko, 93 N.J. at 96 n.2, 459 A.2d at 671 n.2. (Handler, J.,
dissenting).
" Berko, 93 N.J. at 85, 459 A.2d at 665; see supra notes 77 & 78 and accompanying text.
112 Berko, 93 N.J. at 97, 459 A.2d at 671 (Handler, J., dissenting).
113 Id.
4 Id., 459 A.2d at 671-72 (Handler, J., dissenting).
15 Id. at 97 n.3, 459 A.2d at 672 n.3 (Handler, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 98, 459 A.2d at 672 (Handler, J.,
dissenting). The other basis for the public policy
rationale criticized by Justice Handler was "the 'notion' that a taxpayer is the employer of the
police officer or fire fighter .. ."The dissent observed that if an employment relationship
existed, suits against negligent taxpayers/employers would be barred by New Jersey's worker's
compensation statute, thereby obviating the need for a fireman's rule. Id. at 98-99, 459 A.2d at
672 (Handler, J., dissenting).
117 Id. at 98, 459 A.2d at 672 (Handler, J.,dissenting). It seems highly doubtful that the
majority intended to restrict the application of the fireman's rule to only those who pay taxes to
the municipality or governmental entity furnishing the fire and police protection. The majority's
use of the term "'taxpayer" was more likely to illustrate the broader concept-namely that
negligent persons in general should not be exposed to liability for acts providing the occasion for
an officer's presence at the scene, since taxpayers in general have already paid for that response
through taxes.
1I8 Id.

"I Id. at 99-100, 459 A.2d at 673 (Handler, J., dissenting). The dissent cited Renz v. Penn
Cent. Corp., 87 N.J. 437, 435 A.2d 540 (1981) wherein Justice Handler ruled that a suit against a
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Justice Handler further found the policy underlying the rescue
doctrine, which allows recovery to the rescuer, to be appropriate in
the Berko context. 20 The dissent reasoned that while the doctrine
usually is at issue in cases of voluntary rather than professional rescuers, the rule should have even more vitality in the case of professional rescuers. Because recovery is based on the foreseeability of
rescue, professional rescuers, in Justice Handler's view, are deserving
that profesof a greater duty of care because of the greater likelihood
12
sional rescuers will respond to an emergency situation.'
The dissent also questioned the majority's concern for the "citizen" who, absent the fireman's rule, would be civilly liable to a police
officer or firefighter for negligent acts that led to the police officer's or
firefighters presence at the scene.1 22 Justice Handler suggested that the
majority's sympathy was misplaced, since the "citizen's acts are often
a source of a great deal of "social and personal misfortune.'"123 Such a
railroad should lie despite the apparent bar created by the Railroad Immunity Act, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 48:12-152 (West 1969), which defined conduct such as that engaged in by the plaintiff to
constitute contributory negligence. Justice Handler reasoned in Renz that since "contributorv
negligence is no longer a part of New Jersey common law jurisprudence. ...Renz, 87 N.J. at
456, 435 A.2d at 550, the case should proceed under the comparative negligence statute. Thus,
the court "infused" the doctrine of comparative negligence into the Railroad Immunity Act. See
also Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958) (overturning
state's policy of extending tort immunity to charitable institutions); Harrison v. Middlesex Water
Co., 158 N.J. Super. 368, 386 A.2d 405 (App. Div. 1978) (state statute nullifying duty of care of
particular class of landowners should be given "narrow range"), rev'd on other grounds, 80 N.J.
391, 401, 403 A.2d 910, 915 (1979).
120 Berko, 93 N.J. at 100, 459 A.2d at 673 (Handler, J., dissenting). The "rescue doctrine,"
based on the underlying notion that rescue is foreseeable, allows the rescuer to recover from the
person whose act necessitated the rescue. See W. Pnossee, supra note 23, at 276-77.
121 Berko, 93 N.J. at 100, 459 A.2d at 673 (Handler, J., dissenting). Some jurisdictions
recognize the applicability of the rescue doctrine to professional rescuers. but restrict its scope by
applying notions of assumption of risk similar to those raised in cases applying the fireman's rule.
See, e.g., Maltman v. Sauer, 84 Wash. 2d 975, 978, 530 P.2d 254, 257 (1975) (professional
rescuer cannot recover under rescue doctrine where "the hazard ultimately responsible for
causing the injury is inherently within the ambit of those dangers which are unique to and
generally associated with the particular rescue activity").
Similarly, the Florida District Court of Appeals applied the rescue doctrine where a police
officer was injured while helping to lift an automobile in order to allow access to an accident
victim pinned behind the steering wheel. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v.Korte, 357 So. 2d 228, 231
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) ("[i]f... in attempting a rescue, [the professional rescuer] is injured
performing acts or incurring risks beyond the call of his normal duties, or if he is injured as a
result of a danger' not reasonably foreseeable, he should recover"). But cf. Buchanan v. Prickett
& Sons, Inc., 203 Neb. 684, 688, 279 N.W.2d 855, 858 (1979) (rescue doctrine inapplicable to
professional rescuers because -[t]he rescue doctrine contemplates a voluntary act by one who, in
an emergency and prompted by spontaneous human motives to save human life, attempts a
rescue which he had no duty to attempt by virtue of a legal obligation or duty fastened on him by
his employment").
'22 Berko, 93 N.J. at 100-01, 459 A.2d at 673 (Handler, J., dissenting).
12 Id. at 101, 459 A.2d at 673 (Handler, J., dissenting).
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person, continued Justice Handler, does not deserve greater protection
than the officer injured in dealing with the results of the tortfeasor's
conduct.1 24 Further, the dissent noted that insulating negligent persons from suits by police officers and firefighters will diminish the
deterrent effect of potential tort liability. 125 Finally, Justice Handler
observed that the application of the fireman's rule to police officers
has the unfortunate and unfair effect of limiting their sources of
redress to workers' compensation benefits and law suits against poten12 6
tially judgment-proof car thieves.
Despite the Berko court's apparent clarification of the fireman's
rule by extending its coverage to police officers, the court's decision
may well provide fertile ground for future litigation to determine the
scope of the doctrine. It could be argued that, in terms of the circumstances under which actions should be barred, the majority has unnecessarily limited the reach of the rule, while the dissenting justices have
interpreted it as having a broader sweep than intended.
It should be remembered that the rule had its origin in the
context of firefighters' personal injury suits. In that context, negligently caused fires generally were the focus of the courts' attention,
and the Krauth court's basis for the public policy rationale rested on
127
the express assumption that most fires are the result of negligence.
The unnecessary restriction of the rule by the Berko majority arises
from the court's insistence that the rule will operate only to bar suits
for acts of ordinary negligence which provide the occasion for the
28
firefighter or police officer being at the scene where he is injured.

Id. at 102, 459 A.2d at 674 (Handler, J.,dissenting).
Id.; see Comment, supra note 30, at 245, where the author suggests that the same criticism
could be made of the workers' compensation scheme but notes that in both cases the courts and
the legislature have favored the public policies underlying the fireman's rule and workers'
compensation statutes over the deterrent value of allowing tort recoveries.
12 Berko, 93 N.J. at 102, 459 A.2d at 674 (Handler, J.,dissenting).
127 Krauth, 31 N.J. at 274, 157 A.2d at 131. The court expressly did not address the issue of a
firefighter's suit against "'an arsonist or one who deliberately induces a false alarm." Id. at 277,
157 A.2d at 132.
1' Berko, 93 N.J. at 84, 459 A.2d at 664. One could speculate that the standard of "ordinary
negligence" announced in Berko was simply an adoption of the dictum in Trainor wherein the
court stated: "If extended to policemen, the rule would preclude recovery by a police officer only
for acts of ordinary negligence which create the occasion for a police officer's presence at the
place where he is injured." Trainor, 86 N.J. at 407, 432 A.2d at 25. While not directly addressing
the fireman's rule, the Trainor court doubtless sought guidance from the language in Krauth
which spoke of the rule's application to the negligent acts causing fires. See Krauth, 31 N.J. at
274, 157 A.2d at 131. Justice Weintraub in Krauth, however, hinted that the rule might not be
limited to acts of "ordinary" negligence. In addressing the plaintiff's claim that the defendant's
wantonness should provide an exception to the rule, the court acknowledged, "[i]n the context of
the policy considerations which underlie the rule of non-liability for negligence with respect to
124
125
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Unfortunately, problems arise when the doctrine which was tailored
to the problem of negligently-created fires is applied in the same
fashion to police officers. The difficulty is traceable to the differences
in duties required in each occupation. Police officers, unlike firefighters, spend a significant amount of time responding to situations that
are not even arguably the result of ordinary negligence. 29 Police
officers are routinely summoned to deal with armed felons, to quell
violent disputes, and to remedy the consequences of the reckless acts of
citizens. Therefore, the Berko court's interpretation of the fireman's
rule as barring suits only for acts of ordinary negligence which provide
the occasion for the officer's response suggests that any act more
culpable in degree than ordinary negligence would be actionable by a
police officer. This restriction seems to contravene the public policy
enumerated in Berko, which suggested that recovery by police officers
would result in multiple burdens on taxpayers, because police officers
are specifically employed to confront situations which do not arise as a
result of ordinary negligence. Under the majority's public policy reasoning, it would seem that the fireman's rule should apply regardless
of the nature of the conduct that provided the occasion for the officer's
presence, because the risk of injury to the officer is not increased
simply because that conduct is more culpable than ordinary negli30
gence. 1
The oft-cited hypothetical-a police officer struck by a speeding motorist while placing a ticket on an illegally parked car and who
then is unable to sue the owner of the parked car for negligent
parking-is illustrative of the difficulties inherent in restricting the
rule to acts of ordinary negligence. 131 A literal reading of the example
leaves one with the clear impression that if the police officer could
prove that the car had been recklessly or even intentionally parked
unlawfully, recovery would not be barred by the fireman's rule. Such
a result would be contrary to the public policy announcements in
Krauth and Berko. Absent any subsequent act of misconduct, the risk
to the officer ticketing an illegally parked car is the same whether the
32
car was negligently, recklessly, or intentionally parked. 1
the origination of a fire, it is debatable whether degrees of culpability are at all pertinent." Id. at
277, 157 A.2d at 132.
'2 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
130 This does not mean that officers would be left without a remedy for intentional injuries
inflicted upon them once on the scene. Krueger v. City of Anaheim, 130 Cal. App. 3d 166, 171,
181 Cal. Rptr. 631, 634-35 (Ct. App. 1982); see supra note 79.
"I See Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d at 203 n.2, 571 P.2d at 611 n.2, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 154 n.2.
112 In this regard the California Supreme Court has gone further than New Jersey, and has
specifically extended the fireman's rule to protect reckless acts providing the occasion for an
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Similar difficulties in determining what type of initial acts should
be shielded from liability arise in the context of the rule's application
to firefighters summoned to fight fires which have been recklessly or
intentionally set. Specifically, under the rule of Berko, the fireman's
rule would not appear to bar an injured firefighter's suit against an
arsonist or one who recklessly set fires. While the Krauth court refrained from deciding the issue of intentionally-set fires, 33 the appellate division in Jackson v. Velveray Corp. suggested that the cause of
the fire should be immaterial in applying the fireman's rule. 3 4 Judge
Sullivan, writing for a unanimous panel, referred to the law's lack of
concern with the nature of the origin of the fire, and suggested that
the focus of the inquiry should be whether, once on the scene, firefighters faced hazards "not inevitable or inherent in fighting [a] fire of
that kind and extent."13 5 Thus, it could be argued that firefighters are
paid to fight fires regardless of their origin, and in return accept the
risks inherent in dealing with the particular type of fire to which they
36
are summoned. 1
It would then appear that in the case of police officers, the Berko
court's restriction of the rule's application to acts of ordinary negligence which provide the reason for the officer's response is inappropriate given the nature of a police officer's duties. The "ordinary
negligence" standard also poses problems, as discussed above, in the
case of firefighters who are paid to fight fires regardless of their origin.
The courts of at least one state have extended the rule to cover reckless
acts providing the occasion for an officer's presence, "3 but virtually no

officer's presence. See Hubbard v. Boelt, 28 Cal. 3d 480. 620 P.2d 156, 169 Cal. Rptr. 706
(1980); Krueger v. City of Anaheim, 130 Cal. App. 3d 166, 171, 181 Cal. Rptr. 631, 634-35 (Ct.
App. 1982). The Hubbardcourt noted that different degrees of culpability can produce identical
risks. Hubbard v. Boelt, 28 Cal. 3d 480, 484, 620 P.2d 156, 158, 169 Cal. Rptr. 706, 708 (1980).
Thus, it would be unfair to decide the permissibility of an injured officer's suit based on the
nature of the conduct which created the need for the officer's presence. Id.
133 Krauth, 31 N.J. at 277, 157 A.2d at 132.
134 Jackson, 82 N.J. Super. at 479, 198 A.2d at 121; see supra notes 34-41 and accompanying
text.
135 Jackson, 82 N.J. Super. at 479, 198 A.2d at 121.
136 Id. at 475, 198 A.2d at 118-19. The court defined risks inherent in tire rignung to ntuuc
"smoke, flame, and the like." Id. The court continued: "The collapse of a floor, ceiling or wall of
a burning building, without more, is a hazard a fireman must ordinarily anticipate." Id. An
examination of the inherent risks enumerated by the Jackson court suggests that such risks will
exist independent of the degree of culpability of the tortfeasor. Therefore, barring the unusual
circumstance of an arsonist setting a fire with the intention of injuring responding firefighters,
the fireman's rule should probably apply to a suit against an arsonist.
"I See Hubbard v. Boelt, 28 Cal. 3d 480, 620 P.2d 156, 169 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1980); infra note
142; Krueger v. City of Anaheim, 130 Cal. App. 3d 166, 181 Cal. Rptr. 631 (Ct. App. 1982);
supra note 79.
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court has taken the final step of insulating a wrongdoer from liability
for an intentional act which results in the officer's presence at the
scene. If the public policy rationale for the fireman's rule of precluding multiple burdens on taxpayers for injuries to police officers and
firefighters is indeed as strong as the Krauth and Berko opinions
suggest, it would seem that the rule should also bar suits in such
situations, because intentional wrongdoing often gives rise to the types
of situations to which police officers and firefighters are paid to
respond.1 38 The reluctance of the courts to bar suits in these circumstances may be due, in part, to confusion between intentional acts
such as arson or robbery which summon the officer to the scene, and
those acts which are specifically intended to injure the responding
officer.
While there is virtually no disagreement with the proposition
that the fireman's rule should not operate to bar a police officer's or
firefighter's suit for intentionally inflicted injuries, different courts
have justified this result in various ways. Some jurisdictions allow the
officer's suit on the basis of public policy, while others hold that an
officer does not assume the risk of an intentional assault. Still others
permit suit because the tortfeasor violated a statute that was designed
to protect the officer.
The difficulty in applying the first two rationales and the concomitant possibility of inconsistent results suggest the need for a theory of recovery that does not require invoking public policy or wrestling with the concept of assumption of the risk. The statutory
violation approach, which is simpler to apply, has not been taken by
the New Jersey courts, despite the existence of a New Jersey statute
dealing with assaults on police officers, firefighters, and emergency
medical personnel.1 39 It is generally agreed that in order to allow

138 See Comment, supra note 30, at 239, 244-45. The author analogizes the public's relation to
the officer as that of an employee in a hazardous workplace. "Since the public has no need for
[police officers' and firefighters'] services until some danger arises, there is no 'workplace' for
these officers except for hazardous ones." Id. at 239. Thus, as is the case for workers' compensation where injuries are compensated if they - 'aris[e] out of and in the scope of employment,' "
the public compensates police officers and firefighters if their injury arose out of the act which
occasioned their presence on the scene, even if the act was foreseeably injurious. Id. Continuing
with the analogy, the author suggests that third parties stand in the same relation to police
officers and firefighters in the context of the fireman's rule as they do to employees in the
workers' compensation setting. Just as a negligent third party is liable to an employee, despite the
worker's right to make a compensation claim, a similarly negligent third party should be liable to
the injured officer, despite the coexistence of the officer's valid workers' compensation claim. Id.
at 240.
139 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-lb(5) (West 1982). N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-la (West 1982)
defines simple assault. The statute provides: "A person is guilty of assault if he: (1) Attempts to
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recovery for injuries caused by violation of a statute, the statute or
ordinance violated must have been enacted for the purpose of protecting the class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member. 40 By
elevating a simple assault to an aggravated assault if committed on a
police officer, firefighter, or person engaged in providing emergency
medical treatment, the legislature has clearly evinced an intent to
protect that class of persons.' 4' Thus, it would seem that an exception
to the fireman's rule could be based on a violation of that statute. This
approach, however, is not without limitations. For instance, a recovery would still be barred if the statute in question was not enacted for
the protection of police officers or firefighters,1 42 or if the intentional
act which caused the officer's injury does not amount to a violation of
43
any particular statute.
An approach which would allow recovery for all intentional acts
which cause injuries, regardless of whether those acts constitute a
violation of a statute, and yet would avoid the difficulties inherent in
applying the public policy policy rationale, is the "independent act"
exception to the fireman's rule. The independent act exception states
that an officer may recover for injuries resulting from any act other
than that which occasioned his presence on the scene. 144

cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or (2) Negligently
causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or (3) Attempts by physical menace to put
another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury." Further, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 12-1b states
that:
A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: . . . (5) Commits a simple assault
...
upon (a) Any law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his
duties . . . ; or (b) Any paid or volunteer fireman acting in the performance of
his duties . . . ; or (c) Any person engaged in emergency first-aid or medical services ....
Id. Although no statutory violation existed in Krauth, the court noted in dictum that a statutory
violation could provide a basis for an exception to the fireman's rule. Krauth, 31 N.J. at 274, 157
A.2d at 131.
110See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 23, at 192-95.
'
See supra note 139.
'4
It is debatable whether certain fire and traffic ordinances are intended to protect firefighters and police officers. See Hubbard v. Boelt, 28 Cal. 3d 480, 620 P.2d 156, 169 Cal. Rptr. 706
(1980) (traffic ordinances intended to protect general public but not police officers); Kelly v.
Henry Muhs Co., 71 N.J.L. 358, 59 A. 23 (Sup. Ct. 1904) (statute requiring that elevators and
trapdoors be protected by guardrails not specifically intended to protect firefighters).
'43 See, e.g., Lipson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 362, 644 P.2d 822, 181 Cal. Rptr. 629
(1982). In Lipson, the intentional act in question was a misrepresentation of the toxic nature of
burning materials which injured the responding officers. The intentional act of misrepresentation which occurred in Lipson is an example of the admittedly limited types of circumstances in
which an intentional act which results in the injury to police officers or firefighters is not
necessarily violative of a statute. The Lipson court, however, allowed a recovery based on the
independent act exception. Id.
14 See Berko, 93 N.J. at 91, 459 A.2d at 668; Trainor, 86 N.J. at 407, 432 A.2d at 25.
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In order to use the independent act approach, the nature of the
conduct which gives rise to the officer's presence and the conduct
engaged in subsequent to the officer's arrival must be carefully distinguished. The California case of Hubbard v. Boelt 45 is illustrative of
the distinction. In Hubbard the police officer recorded the defendant
driving his automobile at fifty miles per hour in a twenty-five miles
per hour zone. The officer turned on the emergency lights and siren,
and began pursuit. In order to avoid apprehension, the defendant
accelerated his car to a speed reaching one hundred miles per hour at
times, which culminated in a collision that injured the pursuing officer. 146 The Hubbardcourt concluded that the defendant's driving was
reckless, but that the fireman's rule should operate to bar the police
officer's suit.1 47 The officer argued that the suit should not be barred

because his response was directed only to the initial act of speeding.
He maintained that the act which caused his injuries was the defendant's subsequent acceleration to avoid arrest. 48 The officer contended that since that act was committed after the defendant was
aware of his presence, it should fall within the independent act exception to the fireman's rule. The court in Hubbard, while agreeing that
subsequent acts of misconduct are not shielded by the fireman's rule,
found that no independent act had occurred. 49 Justice Tobriner, an
opponent of the fireman's rule, dissented, noting that even assuming
the rule's validity, it was misapplied by the Hubbard majority. 5 0 The
dissent stated that the defendant's acceleration to avoid arrest was an
actionable independent act of misconduct because it occurred after
the officer was on the scent.'

51

Thus, Hubbard provides an excellent example of the critical
distinction between initial and subsequent acts of misconduct. The
case also illustrates the difficulty a court may have in determining

14'

28 Cal. 3d 480, 620 P.2d 156, 169 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1980).

Id. at 483-84, 620 P.2d at 157-58, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 707-08.
Id. at 485, 620 P.2d at 159, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
141 Id. at 486, 620 P.2d at 159, 169 Cal. Rptr. at
709.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 487, 620 P.2d at 160, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 710 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
ll Id. at 488, 620 P.2d at 161, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 710 (Tobriner, J., dissenting). In addition to
arguing that the defendant's behavior in Hubbard amounted to an independent act of misconduct, Justice Tobriner stated that the actions of the defendant rose to the level of intentionally
injurious. Id. at 488-89, 620 P.2d at 161, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 711 (Tobriner, J., dissenting). Thus,
the dissent based its argument for the misapplication of the fireman's rule on these two separate
grounds. For a criticism of Hubbard, see Note, Hubbard v. Boelt: The Fireman'sRule Extended,
9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 197 (1981). For a specific criticism of the majority's handling of the
independent act issue, see id. at 216-20.
141
141
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whether an act is "independent" and, if so, at what point it becomes
independent in a single ongoing transaction. Perhaps the courts should
look to the defendant's awareness of the officer's presence as the
critical time point in making this determination. Once it is determined that the defendant was or should have been aware of the
officer's presence, the defendant's conduct is tested to see if he
breached a normal duty of care owed to the officer. A California
statute enacted subsequent to Hubbard, adopted just such a standard
by fixing liability on a person for breach of a duty of care owed to
or constructively
certain public officials once the tortfeasor is actually
52
aware of the officer's presence on the scene. 1
New Jersey's position is unclear as to the delineation of a time
point after which conduct falls within the independent act exception.
The Berko court, while endorsing the independent act exception,
provided no specific guidance to enable a court to decide if and when
conduct would be deemed independent. The court did suggest that
once a police officer or firefighter is on the scene, he is owed a duty of
care by the actor whose conduct provided the occasion for the officers'
presence. 53 Although the Trainor court suggested that awareness of

152 CAL. Civ. CODE

§

1714.9(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1984) provides as follows:

(a) Notwithstanding statutory or decisional law to the contrary, any person is
responsible not only for the results of that person's willful acts causing injury to a
peace officer, firefighter, or any emergency medical personnel employed by a public
entity, but also for any injury occasioned to that person by the want of ordinary care
or skill in the management of the person's property or person, in any of the following
circumstances:
(1) Where the conduct causing the injury occurs after the person knows or
should have known of the presence of the peace officer, firefighter, or emergency
medical personnel.
(2) Where the conduct causing the injury occurs after the person knows or
should have known of the presence of the peace officer, firefighter, or emergency
medical personnel, violates a statute, ordinance, or regulation, and was the proximate cause of an injury which the statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to
prevent, and the statute, ordinance or regulation was designed to protect the peace
officer, firefighter, or emergency medical personnel.
As used in this subdivision, a statute, ordinance, or regulation prohibiting
resistance or requiring a person to comply with an order of a peace officer or
firefighter is designed to protect the peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical
personnel.
(3) Where the conduct causing the injury was intended to injure the peace
officer, firefighter, or emergency medical personnel.
(4) Where the conduct causing the injury is arson as defined in Section 451 of
the Penal Code.
Id.
53 Berko, 93 N.J. at 91, 459 A.2d at 668. Specifically, the court stated: "Just as Krauth
. . . saw no duty to exercise care so as not to require a firefighter's aid, we see no reason to
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the officer's presence was a factor in finding an act to be independent,
the court did not base its decision on the independent act exception,1 4
and the "awareness" aspect of Trainor was, in fact, ignored by the
Berko court.
If New Jersey had adopted the independent act exception as
described above, any act engaged in by the initial tortfeasor once he is
or should be aware of the officer's presence on the scene would be
deemed an independent act which could visit liability on the actor for
a breach of the normal duty of care owed to the officer. Requiring a
normal duty of care once the defendant is or should be aware of the
officer's presence is consistent with the rule's imposition of potential
liability on third parties whose conduct was not responsible for the
summoning of the police or fire personnel. If one accepts the proposition that the fireman's rule is not intended to protect third parties who
injure police officers or firefighters in the course of performing their
duties,' 5 - it would follow that the rule should not benefit a person
whose conduct caused the presence of the officer, once that person is
aware of the officer's presence. Both owe the officer a duty of care.
Therefore, negligent, reckless, or intentional acts of misconduct resulting in injury to the officer, committed by the defendant subsequent to his actual or constructive awareness of the officer's presence
on the scene should be actionable. 56 Even intentionally injurious acts
which rise to the level of assaults would fall within the independent
act exception because one who intentionally injures an officer, by
definition, is aware of his presence. Thus, the independent act exception would provide an injured police officer with a cause of action for
all intentionally injurious acts without involving the court in questions
regarding statutory violations, public policy, or the extent of the risks
normally assumed by police officers.

eliminate the duty to exercise care once the firefighter, or a police officer, begins to render that
aid." Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
154 Trainor, 86 N.J. at 407, 432 A.2d at 25. While the New Jersey Supreme Court has never
specifically decided a case involving the subsequent act exception, the Trainor court, in dictum,
stated that the fireman's rule "could not be asserted as a defense where, as here, after the officer
arrived at the scene and the defendant was aware of his presence, the defendant committed
additional and subsequent acts of negligence which directly caused the officer's injuries." Id.
,55See, e.g., Kocan v. Garino, 107 Cal. App. 3d 291, 295-96, 165 Cal. Rptr. 712, 715 (Ct.
App. 1980), Sutton v. Shufelberger, 31 Wash. App. 579, 643 P.2d 920 (Ct. App. 1982); infra
note 158.
156 Extending this line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that criminals who attempt to resist
arrest, once aware of the officer's presence, proceed at peril of civil liability for any injuries
resulting to the officers attempting to effect the arrest. Such a result fits comfortably within the
policy concerns underlying the fireman's rule, and is consistent with its concerns for fairness to
the defendant.
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It should be evident from the foregoing that the dissent in Berko
interpreted the rule far too broadly. For example, the dissenting
opinion stated that third party actions for injuries arising in the course
of employment are not available to police officers or firefighters.157 It
would appear that the denial of third party suits is not nearly as
sweeping as the dissent suggests. The fireman's rule as stated by the
Berko majority would bar suit only against the tortfeasor whose conduct provided the occasion for the officer's presence at the scene
where he was injured. 5 8 The rule would not shield even the initial
tortfeasor from suit where the officer was injured by a subsequent act
of misconduct.159 The dissent's concern, therefore, seems unwar60
ranted. 1
The dissent also expressed concern for the adequacy of compensation and benefits available to police officers and firefighters in view of
the hazardous nature of their occupations. 1 6 1 That problem, if it
indeed exists, should be remedied by the municipalities which employ
firefighters and police officers, or by the state legislature, which is
responsible for the workers' compensation and disability benefits extended to public safety officials.
The decision in Berko to extend the fireman's rule to police
officers is fundamentally sound in view of the public policy announced in Krauth. By tracking the language of prior decisions too
closely, however, the court may have restricted the scope of the rule
unnecessarily by allowing its operation only in cases where ordinary
negligence provides the occasion for a firefighter's or police officer's

Berko, 93 N.J. at 95, 459 A.2d at 670 (Handler, J., dissenting).
Id. at 84, 459 A.2d at 664; accord Kocan v. Garino, 107 Cal. App. 3d 291, 295-96, 165
Cal. Rptr. 712, 715 (Ct. App. 1980) (police officer injured in attempt to climb negligently
maintained fence while pursuing suspect allowed to sue landowner, since landowner's "negligence. . . in no way created the risk which was the cause of [the officer's] presence on the
property"); Sutton v. Shufelberger, 31 Wash. App. 579, 643 P.2d 920 (Ct. App. 1982) (police
officer, after stopping motorist, struck by negligently driven truck permitted to sue truck driver
but not stopped motorist).
1s9 Berko, 93 N.J. at 85, 459 A.2d at 665.
160Justice Handler's assertion that firefighters and police officers are not permitted third party
tort suits for injuries arising out of their employment is not supported by New Jersey's workers'
157

151

compensation statute which nowhere precludes their right to sue. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:1540 (West 1981) which states in pertinent part:
Where a third person is liable to the employee or his dependents for an injury or
death, the existence of a right of compensation from the employer or insurance
carrier under this statute shall not operate as a bar to the action of the employee or
his dependents, not be regarded as establishing a measure of damage therein.
Id.
161 Berko, 93 N.J. at 96, 459 A.2d at 670 (Handler, J., dissenting).
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response. This restriction is particularly inappropriate in the case of
police officers, considering the nature of their duties. It is also inappropriate to apply the ordinary negligence requirement to firefighters
who face the same inherent risks regardless of the cause of the fire to
which they have been summoned.
Further, while the Berko court recognized the independent act
exception, it failed to provide specific guidance as to its scope. The
exception should be triggered at the moment of actual or constructive
knowledge of the officer's presence, and the defendant should owe the
officer a duty of care from that point on. Properly applied, the
independent act exception is not a mere "palliative,' 6 2 nor should it
"swallow the rule itself" as was suggested by the dissent in Berko.' 6 3
Rather, the exception ensures that the rule only bars suits by police
officers and firefighters for conduct which necessitated their presence
at the scene.
In order to remove some of the doubt created by the case law
dealing with the fireman's rule, the New Jersey Legislature would be
well advised to adopt legislation similar to that recently enacted in
California. 1 4 In this statute the California Legislature has codified
several exceptions to the fireman's rule, including both the independent act and the statutory violation exceptions. In both instances the
statute is triggered by the defendant's actual or constructive awareness
of the officer's presence. 165 The statute also clearly visits liability on an
67
arsonist, 16 6 and on a defendant who intentionally injures an officer. 1
By adopting the actual or constructive awareness standard, the
California Legislature has eased the task of the courts in the application of the independent act exception. The standard clearly fixes the
time point that should be looked to in order to trigger the duty of care
owed to the responding officers by the person whose conduct provided
the occasion for the response. 168 In addition, the California statute

Id. at 97, 459 A.2d at 671-72 (Handler, J., dissenting).
163Id. at 97 n.3, 459 A.2d at 672 n.3 (Handler, J., dissenting).
164 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.9 (West Cum. Supp. 1984); see supra note 152.
"I'See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.9(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1984); supra note 152.
162

'66

167

CAL. CIV. CODE §

Id. § 1714.9(a)(4).

7

1 14.9(a)(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1984).

166The actual or constructive awareness standard is also interwoven into the statutory violation exception, again allowing an easier analysis of a given factual situation in which a statutory
violation is at issue. The inclusion of the awareness standard in the statutory violation exception
would presumably arise, for example, where a police officer is injured while pursuing a speeding
motorist who is not yet aware of the officer's presence. Under these facts, a suit against the
motorist would not lie under the statutory violation exception.
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resolves any doubt as to certain statutory violations by deeming statutes or ordinances which prohibit resistance to arrest or require a
person to comply with an officer's order as being of the type designed
to protect police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel.169 Thus, in cases like Hubbard 70 where the officer's injuries arose
out of the pursuit of a motorist attempting to avoid arrest, the actor
under the California statute would be liable to the officer, assuming
that resisting arrest violates a statute or ordinance.
The statute's adoption of the intentional harms exception should
totally relieve the courts from having to rely on public policy or
assumption of risk analyses to justify the exception for intentional
harms directed at police officers and firefighters. It should be pointed
out, however, that the California statute only deals with exceptions to
the fireman's rule, not to circumstances under which the rule should
be applied in the first place. The only portion of the California statute
that deals with the defendant's conduct prior to the officer's presence
on the scene is the section allowing suits by injured officers against an
arsonist.' 7' Clearly, the legislature has authority to identify certain
types of response-provoking conduct as being outside the scope of the
fireman's rule. Nevertheless, basing the officer's right to recovery on
the culpable nature of the conduct providing the occasion for the
response seems to contravene the public policy of preventing multiple
burdens on taxpayers by precluding recoveries for injuries resulting
from risks the officer already has been paid to confront. In order to
preserve the public policy concerns enunciated in Krauth and Berko,
the New Jersey Legislature, were it to enact legislation similar to that
of California, should thus make it clear that the degree of culpability
of the response-provoking conduct should play no role in the application of the fireman's rule.
Properly applied, the rule should bar suits by injured police
officers and firefighters against persons whose conduct, without regard to culpability, provided the reason for the officer's presence on
the scene. Once the officer is on the scene and the actor is or should be
aware of his presence, the officer deserves a duty of care, including
the duty of the actor to refrain from intentionally injuring the officer.
The rule simply should not operate to bar suits by police officers
against third persons whose conduct was not responsible for the officer

'69 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.9(a)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1984); supra note 152.
17' 28 Cal. 3d 480, 620 P.2d 156, 169 Cal. Rptr. 706; see spra text accompanying notes 14551.
171

CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.9(a)(4) (West

Cum. Supp. 1984); supra note 152.
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being at the scene. Absent a carefully drafted statute, such an interpretation of the fireman's rule would allow its operation in the very
narrow areas in which it should apply. It would preserve a responding
police officer's right to expect a duty of care from all persons once on
the scene, and would not in any way negate his right to recover from
third persons whose conduct played no role in summoning his response.
lames A. Flynn

